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I. Introduction
In the past twenty years, advances in forensic DNA 
technology have revolutionized the American crimi-
nal justice system.1 The use of forensic DNA testing in 
America began in 1987, and its demonstrated scientific 
accuracy quickly led jurisdictions to accept expert tes-
timony regarding DNA matches between suspects and 
crime scene evidence.2 Wielding the power to exonerate 
the innocent and apprehend the guilty, the use of DNA 
identification technology has become an indispensable 
resource for prosecutors and law enforcement officials, 
as well as for defense lawyers representing persons 
falsely accused or wrongfully convicted of crimes they 
did not commit. As states began to compile DNA pro-
files from convicted offenders, the need for a repository 
for these profiles resulted in the DNA database. 
Originally, DNA databases included only “those 
classes of offenders with a high recidivism rate, such 
as sex offenders and violent felons.”3 Recognizing the 
crime-solving potential of this technology, state legis-
latures soon began to expand the scope of DNA data-
base statutes to include broader classes of offenders. 
Currently, all fifty states have statutes that mandate 
the collection of DNA from individuals convicted of 
certain felonies4 and a few states have expanded their 
statutes even further by authorizing the taking and 
analysis of DNA from certain categories of arrestees. 
This article addresses the constitutionality of taking 
DNA samples from persons subject to arrest. In par-
ticular, this article focuses on the statutes of Virginia 
and Louisiana, which have authorized DNA sampling 
of persons arrested for specified offenses, and exam-
ines whether these laws are consistent with the Fourth 
Amendment’s “special needs” doctrine as outlined by 
several Supreme Court rulings.
A. The Origins of DNA Databases 
The establishment and expansion of state and federal 
DNA databases is predicated on the accuracy of DNA 
profiling and technology. DNA, or deoxyribonucleic 
acid, is the genetic material found in the chromosomes 
of most human cells.5 Each DNA molecule consists of 
two strands, known as a double helix, that contain a 
particular sequence of nucleic acids.6 Although most of 
the human genome consists of genetic information that 
is shared by a majority of the population, each individ-
ual’s chromosomes have minute variations known as 
polymorphisms that serve as unique identifiers.7 While 
some polymorphic genes code for specific traits such 
as eye color, forensic DNA analysis uses noncoding 
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regions to identify the differences in a person’s genetic 
makeup.8 By isolating those areas of the chromosome 
known to be unique to each individual, forensic DNA 
testing can compare two samples to determine if the 
genetic mutations match, indicating that the samples 
contain DNA from the same individual.9 Due to the 
polymorphic nature of DNA, “individual differences 
make identification virtually certain.”10
The most widely used technology for DNA identi-
fication is the polymerase chain reaction technique 
(“PCR”). This technique facilitates DNA identification 
from even a tiny biological sample such as saliva, blood, 
semen, hair, cheek cells and even epithelial skin cells 
by making “millions of copies of the small amount of 
DNA in the sample.”11 Within the DNA copy produced 
by PCR, short tandem repeat (“STR”) technology is 
used to identify genetic loci to distinguish DNA profiles 
“[b]y examining the gene sequence on a specific loca-
tion on a chromosome and comparing the length with 
the gene sequence on the same chromosome from a 
different person.”12 In both state and federal DNA test-
ing laboratories, STR technology is used to identify the 
DNA strand at thirteen specific loci, as designated by 
the Combined DNA Index System (“CODIS”) main-
tained by the Federal Bureau of Investigation.13
The CODIS system “enables federal, state, and local 
crime labs to exchange and compare DNA profiles elec-
tronically, thereby linking crimes to each other and 
to convicted offenders.”14 CODIS began in 1990 as a 
pilot database for fourteen states,15 and was formal-
ized by the DNA Identification Act of 1994.16 The act 
empowered the FBI to create an index of DNA profiles 
from convicted criminals, crime scene evidence, un-
identified human remains and samples “voluntarily 
contributed from relatives of missing persons.”17 By 
1998, CODIS was connected to all fifty states18 as a 
national index linking databases at the local, state and 
national levels.19 All profiles originate at the local level 
in the Local DNA Index System (“LDIS”), which are 
then fed into the State DNA Index System (“SDIS”) 
and the National DNA Index System (“NDIS”).20 In the 
three tiered levels of CODIS, each state maintains its 
own SDIS allowing “state and local agencies to operate 
their databases according to their specific legislative or 
legal requirements.”21
The three levels of CODIS are made up of two in-
dexes, the Convicted Offender index that “contains 
DNA profiles of individuals convicted of felony sex of-
fenses (and other violent crimes)” and the Forensic 
index containing “DNA profiles developed from crime 
scene evidence.”22 As of April 2004, the FBI maintained 
a total of 1,762,005 DNA profiles in the NDIS data-
base.23 These profiles “contain a specimen identifier, 
the sponsoring laboratory’s identifier, the initials (or 
name) of DNA personnel associated with the analysis, 
and the actual DNA characteristics. CODIS does not 
store criminal history information, case-related infor-
mation, social security numbers or dates-of-birth.”24 
Using these two indexes, law enforcement officials at 
the state and local levels are able to search between 
crime scene evidence and individual DNA profiles from 
around the nation.  
All fifty states currently have legislation requiring 
that DNA profiles of certain categories of individuals 
be included in at least two levels of CODIS.25 But the 
legislation concerning what classes of offenders are to 
be incorporated varies widely from state to state.26 The 
lack of consistency of state legislation is even more 
problematic due to the huge backlog of samples wait-
ing to be analyzed and catalogued in state and local 
DNA testing facilities. Congress attempted to combat 
this problem by passing the DNA Analysis Backlog 
Elimination Act of 2000.27 This statute authorized the 
Attorney General to issue grants to the states for the 
purpose of carrying out “for inclusion in the Combined 
DNA Index System of the Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion, DNA analyses of samples taken from individuals 
convicted of a qualifying state offense.”28
In 2004, however, the Attorney General submitted a 
report to Congress regarding the DNA evidence backlog 
that cited “approximately 542,700 criminal cases with 
biological evidence” awaiting testing and analysis.29 
The reason for this massive backlog is that state and 
local crime laboratories are “overworked, understaffed 
and insufficiently funded.”30 President Bush has made 
additional efforts to reduce this backlog through his 
initiative Advancing Justice Through DNA Technology 
by proposing “$1 billion in funding over 5 years to re-
duce the DNA testing backlog, build crime lab capacity, 
stimulate research and development, support training, 
protect the innocent, and identify missing persons.”31 
States legislatures have also realized the potential of 
DNA technology to assist in solving crimes and con-
victing the guilty. Recognizing the importance of ex-
panding DNA databases to accomplish this goal, many 
states have increased the number of individuals eligible 
for inclusion in these databases. As states broaden the 
category of offenders, they will increase their eligibility 
for federal funding to reduce their backlogs and solve 
more crimes. 
B. The Statutes of Virginia and Louisiana 
Authorizing the Taking of DNA from 
Arrestees
Two of the most aggressive states in DNA database ex-
pansion are Virginia and Louisiana. In 2002, Virginia 
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enacted a provision allowing the taking and analysis 
of a DNA sample for “[e]very person arrested for the 
commission or attempted commission of a violent fel-
ony” to “determine identification characteristics spe-
cific to the person.”32 Those eligible for DNA testing are 
individuals arrested for the following offenses: first and 
second degree murder and voluntary manslaughter,33 
mob-related felonies,34 any kidnapping or abduction 
felony,35 any malicious felonious assault or malicious 
bodily wounding,36 robbery,37 carjacking,38 criminal 
sexual assault39 or arson.40 After obtaining the sample 
from the arrestee’s person, the sample is analyzed and 
the remainder of sample is stored by the Division of 
Forensic Sciences41 “in accordance with specific proce-
dures adopted by regulation of the Division to ensure 
the integrity and confidentiality of the samples.”42 The 
Commonwealth of Virginia makes the results of the 
analysis of DNA samples “available directly to federal, 
state and local law-enforcement officers upon request 
made in furtherance of an official investigation of any 
criminal offense.”43 The unauthorized use or dissemi-
nation of information from stored DNA samples is a 
punishable misdemeanor.44
Virginia’s DNA database, begun in 1989, is the oldest 
and largest DNA database in the country.45 As the first 
state to take DNA from convicted felons and arrestees, 
Virginia has led the nation in DNA database expansion. 
State Attorney General Jerry W. Kilgore, who proposed 
the legislative package for the database expansion to ar-
restees has stated, “DNA is the fingerprint of today…it’s 
a public safety issue.”46 Hinting to the legislative intent 
behind the expansion, General Kilgore has stated that 
“[i]t’s no secret that an enhanced database increases 
the chances of solving crimes,”47 and that “[database 
expansion] will help us solve cases much quicker and 
ensure public safety by making sure somebody’s not 
released back into the general public who has com-
mitted a string of crimes.”48 Tim Murtaugh, a spokes-
man for the Attorney General, has stated that “[w]e see 
[DNA database expansion] as an important tool for 
law enforcement that helps the victims of crimes and 
the families of victims.”49 Moreover, a spokeswoman of 
Virginia Delegate Ryan McDougle, who sponsored HB 
829 to expand the state’s DNA database to cover ar-
restees, confirmed that the legislative intent behind the 
bill was to match the DNA of violent felony arrestees to 
DNA evidence from unsolved crimes and not to merely 
obtain the identity of those arrested by the state.50
In 2003, Louisiana enacted legislation expanding its 
DNA databases to cover certain categories of arrest-
ees. Louisiana authorizes the taking of DNA samples 
from “[a] person who is arrested for a felony or other 
specified offense, including an attempt, conspiracy, 
criminal solicitation, or accessory after the fact of such 
offenses.”51 These other specified offenses include: bat-
tery,52 unlawful use of a laser on a police officer,53 simple 
assault,54 assault on a schoolteacher,55 stalking,56 mis-
demeanor carnal knowledge of a juvenile,57 prostitu-
tion,58 soliciting for prostitutes,59 prostitution by mas-
sage,60 letting premises for prostitution61 and peeping 
tom62 offenses. Louisiana also permits DNA testing of 
juveniles who are arrested for similar felony offenses 
or attempts.63 Additionally, the legislature provided 
for recommendation by the state police for the inclu-
sion of other categories of offenders in the state DNA 
database, stating that “the state police shall consider 
those offenses for which DNA testing will have a sub-
stantial impact on the detection and identification of 
sex offenders and other violent offenders.”64 Louisiana 
further authorizes the exchange of DNA profiles con-
tained within the state database pursuant to the guide-
lines and requestor identification verification adopted 
by the state police.65 Like the state of Virginia, Louisi-
ana prohibits unauthorized disclosure of any identify-
ing DNA information.66
Although the current Louisiana statute authorizing 
DNA testing of arrestees was passed in 2003, the his-
tory of the legislation dates back to 1997.67 Although 
technically one of the first states to pass such broad 
DNA legislation, due to a lack of funding the data-
base failed to become a reality by its September 1, 1999 
implementation date and was repealed by the legisla-
ture that year.68 As other states pushed forward with 
legislation to expand their DNA databases, Louisiana 
was at a standstill for lack of funding. In 2000, one 
assistant director at the Louisiana State Police crime 
lab commented, “[w]e’re required to do something, 
and we have no funding to do it. Therefore, we have 
no data bank.”69 
It took the tragic acts of serial killer Derrick Todd Lee 
to motivate Louisiana to push for legislation to expand 
the state’s DNA database to cover certain categories of 
arrestees. After interviewing and analyzing DNA from 
over 600 men, police officials in Louisiana had no de-
finitive leads in the investigation of the serial killing of 
five women in and around Baton Rouge.70 When a state 
official received a tip that Lee was a suspect in a 1992 
murder and the 1998 disappearance of two women 
from Zachary, Louisiana, police began investigating 
Lee’s extensive criminal history, which included peep-
ing into homes, stalking and attempted murder.71 Police 
officials obtained a warrant to take and analyze Lee’s 
DNA, which was matched with trace evidence from 
four murder victims attributed to the Baton Rouge 
serial killer.72 Lee was subsequently charged with five 
counts of murder, five counts of aggravated rape, ag-
gravated burglary, and second-degree kidnapping.73 
Speaking of the Lee case, Ray Wickenheiser, the direc-
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tor of the Acadiana Crime Lab in Louisiana stated, 
“[t]here’s no doubt in my mind that with arrestee test-
ing – I can guarantee – four lives would have been 
saved. If we had proper arrestee information, [Lee] 
would have been arrested after the first case.”74
Other evidence indicating the purpose behind Loui-
siana’s DNA law can be gleaned from statements made 
by Louisiana state representative Huntington “Hunt” 
Downer, who sponsored the 1997 DNA legislation. “I 
really think [DNA] ought to be [taken from] every-
body who’s arrested. Had there been DNA sampling 
early on in [the Lee] criminal case, maybe we could 
have caught [Lee] before he killed.”75 Downer has ad-
ditionally commented, “DNA is a fingerprint; it’s not 
an invasion of privacy. It’s getting guilty people off the 
streets and innocent people out of jail.”76 Interestingly, 
an amendment by Downer that would have applied the 
law to anyone arrested for any offense was removed by 
the legislature before the passage of the bill.77
Louisiana left no doubt as to the purpose behind 
extending the DNA database to arrestees. In fact, the 
state enacted a statute explaining that “[t]he Loui-
siana Legislature finds and declares that DNA data 
banks are important tools in criminal investigations, 
in the exclusion of individuals who are the subject of 
criminal investigations or prosecutions, and in deter-
ring and detecting recidivist acts.”78 Like most states, 
Louisiana suffers a massive backlog of DNA samples 
waiting to be analyzed.79 By expanding its database, the 
state can expect to increase its federal funding to help 
reduce that backlog. State senator Jay Dardenne, who 
sponsored the 2003 bill, stated that even if the money 
needed to pay for the expansion is not available in the 
state budget, the bill was needed to “attract a federal 
grant that would pay for the testing of 27,000 inmates 
in state prisons and people on probation or parole.”80 
Dardenne further stated in a Louisiana senate floor 
debate that the real benefit of expanding the database 
to include arrestees was to identify the culprits of crime 
and help convict the guilty, especially after the Derrick 
Todd Lee case.81
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Consti-
tution guarantees all persons the right to be free from 
unreasonable searches and seizures.82 The expansion of 
DNA databases in states such as Virginia and Louisi-
ana has generated a great deal of controversy regarding 
the Fourth Amendment rights of arrestees.83 Imagine, 
for example, a scenario where law enforcement officials 
suspect an individual, John Doe, as the perpetrator of 
a series of rapes, but lack probable cause or the lesser 
standard of reasonable suspicion for the individual’s 
arrest or investigatory seizure. Both Virginia and Loui-
siana give police the authority to take a DNA sample 
from Doe if he is arrested for another serious offense. 
If Doe, let’s say, is arrested in Louisiana for soliciting 
prostitution, the police can obtain a DNA sample in 
order to compare it with a sample from the crime scene 
evidence of the serial rapist.  
Or, imagine a second scenario where a person, Joe 
Smith, is arrested in Virginia for robbery. A DNA sam-
ple is taken from Smith pursuant to his arrest. Months 
later, state officials determine that Smith’s DNA 
matches the DNA trace evidence found at the scene 
of an unsolved murder. In both hypotheticals, the link 
connecting the suspects to the unsolved crimes is the 
taking and analysis of a DNA sample from the suspect 
upon being arrested.84 This paper addresses whether 
this procedure is consistent with Fourth Amendment 
principles.
II. Does DNA Samlping Constitute a Search?
The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable 
searches and seizures. Thus, if DNA sampling is to trig-
ger Fourth Amendment protections, it must be either 
a search or seizure. To determine whether a particular 
governmental intrusion constitutes a search, the Court 
asks whether the target of the intrusion has a subjective 
expectation of privacy in the information obtained by 
the government, and whether “society is prepared to 
accept that expectation as objectively reasonable.”85 In 
deciding whether an arrestee has a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy in his or her DNA profile, the Court will 
most likely consider three factors: the extent to which 
DNA is exposed to the public, the extent of any bodily 
intrusion in obtaining the DNA sample, and the nature 
of the information extracted from a DNA profile.86
A. Exposure to the Public
Information or property that is exposed to the public 
is generally not protected by the Fourth Amendment. 
To determine whether a particular governmental intrusion constitutes a search, 
the Court asks whether the target of the intrusion has a subjective expectation 
of privacy in the information obtained by the government, and whether  
“society is prepared to accept that expectation as objectively reasonable.”
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Thus, even forcible police intrusions to obtain infor-
mation revealed to the public will not be considered a 
search. Compelling an individual to provide a voice ex-
emplar, for instance, is not a search because the physi-
cal characteristics of a person’s voice are constantly 
exposed to the public.87 If one construes this rationale 
broadly, DNA could be considered a physical charac-
teristic that is constantly exposed to the public. We all 
leave traces of DNA everywhere we go – by losing hair, 
leaving saliva on a drinking glass at a restaurant, or 
shedding skin cells. This suggests that acquisition of an 
arrestee’s DNA would not be considered a search.88
The Court, however, is likely to find the taking of 
an arrestee’s DNA is a search. First, the lower court 
cases that have broadly applied the “public exposure” 
rationale have involved only the discovery of limited 
information, such as one’s identification89 or the pres-
ence of chemicals transferred from stolen money.90 
By contrast, DNA can potentially reveal a broad array 
of personal information.91 Second, in Kyllo v. United 
States,92 the Supreme Court ruled that a thermal im-
aging device directed at a home constituted a search 
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The 
Court explained that a search occurs when government 
agents use sense-enhancing technology to collect any 
information regarding the interior of a home that could 
not otherwise be obtained without a physical invasion, 
“at least where (as here) the technology in question is 
not in general public use.”93 Assuming that Kyllo’s hold-
ing is not limited to the home – where Fourth Amend-
ment concerns have typically been the highest – one 
can certainly argue that DNA sampling and analysis 
is sense-enhancing technology that is not in general 
public use.94 Therefore, DNA testing of arrestees would 
constitute a search, even if DNA, like heat emanations, 
is technically exposed to the public.
B. Extent of Bodily Intrusion
Any physical intrusion into the body, such as using 
a needle to withdraw blood, constitutes a search for 
Fourth Amendment purposes. In Schmerber v. Cali-
fornia,95 a case in which blood was forcibly taken from 
an arrestee suspected of drunk driving so that it could 
be tested for its alcohol content, the Court held that 
“such testing procedures plainly constitute searches 
of persons.”96 Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ 
Ass’n97 extended this principle to include the taking of 
breath samples. Skinner involved federal regulations 
mandating drug testing of railway workers who violate 
safety rules or were involved in train accidents without 
individualized suspicion of alcohol or drug use.98 The 
Court held that “[s]ubjecting a person to a breathalyzer 
test…implicates similar concerns about bodily integrity 
and, like the blood-alcohol test [the Court] considered 
in Schmerber, should also be deemed a search.”99
Skinner further held that mandatory urinalysis con-
stitutes a search even though “collecting and testing 
urine samples do not entail a surgical intrusion into 
the body.”100 Urinalysis was a search because “chemical 
analysis of urine, like that of blood, can reveal a host 
of private medical facts about an employee, including 
whether she is epileptic, pregnant, or diabetic.”101 The 
Court further explained that “the process of collecting 
the sample to be tested, which may in some cases in-
volve visual or aural monitoring of the act of urination, 
itself implicates privacy interests.”102
In determining whether the Court will find DNA 
sampling to be a search, one might distinguish Skinner 
on the grounds that there was a further privacy interest 
at stake in that case, to wit, the visual or aural monitor-
ing of the urine sample, that would not be present in 
a case of DNA sampling.103 Further, the privacy con-
cerns implicated by DNA testing and analysis may be 
diminished by limiting access to the information that 
can be obtained from the DNA profile. Despite these 
differences, the Court will likely follow the reasoning 
of Schmerber, Skinner and its progeny when determin-
ing whether DNA sampling and analysis is subject to 
constitutional scrutiny.104 Therefore, although DNA 
sampling can be accomplished in a minimally invasive 
manner by testing epithelial cells, the odds are very 
good that the Court will conclude that the taking and 
analysis of the sample is a search under the Fourth 
Amendment.
C. Nature of the Information Extracted
Finally, the nature of the information obtained by the 
government may be significant in determining whether 
DNA sampling will be deemed a search. An individual’s 
DNA contains a wealth of information.105 Likewise, the 
noncoding regions used in DNA profiling “can indicate 
or predict disease states, and all loci, coding and non-
coding alike, can be used for parentage testing.”106 Con-
cededly, the DNA profiles maintained in the CODIS 
database contain purely biometric identifiers that are 
“represented in the data base…as a series of digits com-
parable to social security numbers or passport num-
bers.”107 Privacy concerns, however, are implicated by 
the maintenance of DNA samples in a databank, much 
like a blood bank. Even scholars like Professor David 
Kaye recognize the privacy interests implicated in the 
storage of DNA in databanks for an infinite period of 
time. “Although health insurers are not particularly 
interested in [DNA] information and although a small 
explosion of state laws ban or restrict [DNA informa-
tion] use in insurance and the workplace, the possibil-
ity that the government will allow the samples to fall 
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suspicionless searches or seizures that are justified by 
governmental interests unrelated to law enforcement 
concerns. 
While the Court has issued several rulings under its 
“special needs” analysis, these cases do not form a co-
herent doctrine. Twelve years ago, Professor William 
Stuntz observed that “little or no effort has been made 
to explain what these ‘special needs’ are; the term turns 
out to be no more than a label 
that indicates when a lax stan-
dard will apply.”112 Since that 
time, the Court’s special needs 
jurisprudence has not become 
more comprehensible. Even 
when a majority of the Court 
can agree on a particular re-
sult, members of the majority 
will disagree over a critical component of the special 
needs analysis.113 In other cases, the ad hoc nature of 
the Court’s reasoning has produced rulings that are not 
logically consistent, which, in turn, has prompted lower 
court decisions that are contradictory.114 More impor-
tantly, and pertinent to the issue of the constitution-
ality of taking an arrestee’s DNA sample, the Court’s 
rulings have not done a very good job of identifying the 
line between law enforcement and special needs.115
The remainder of this article, which contains two 
parts, will canvas the Court’s special needs cases with 
an eye toward identifying the factors that the Court 
will likely emphasize should it address the constitu-
tionality of taking a DNA sample from an arrestee. 
In the first part, I describe the origins of the special 
needs analysis. This part also analyzes the rulings the 
Court has specifically labeled special needs cases. At 
the end of the second part, I will consider two cases, 
New York v. Burger116 and Indianapolis v. Edmond,117 
which have, at times, been lumped together with the 
special needs cases.118 Although these two cases share 
significant characteristics with the special needs cases, 
I believe that, as a doctrinal matter, these cases do 
not fall into the special needs category. Nevertheless, 
both cases draw attention to the issue of searches that 
serve primary and secondary purposes. And both cases 
highlight the conflict between the special needs cases, 
which forbid searches that promote criminal law inter-
ests, and the administrative search cases, which permit 
searches that simultaneously advance civil and crimi-
nal law interests. The final part of the article discusses 
the constitutionality of the Louisiana and Virginia laws 
that authorize the taking of DNA samples from se-
lected arrestees.
into the wrong hands or will misuse them for its own 
purposes must not be ignored.”108 Because DNA has the 
potential to reveal a host of private facts about an ar-
restee, the Court will probably find that forcibly taking 
and testing DNA is a search. 
In sum, should the Court address the constitutional-
ity of Louisiana or Virginia’s statutes authorizing the 
DNA sampling of arrestees, it will most likely find that 
the taking and analyzing of DNA samples is a search. 
If DNA sampling is measured by the three factors dis-
cussed above, the Court’s precedents plainly suggest 
that this process is a search under the Fourth Amend-
ment.109
III. Special Needs Analysis and DNA Searches
If DNA sampling and analysis is deemed a search, it 
must be reasonable in order to comply with the Fourth 
Amendment. In most criminal contexts, a search is 
reasonable if conducted pursuant to a judicial warrant 
or based on individualized probable cause.110 Because 
neither Louisiana nor Virginia’s statutes authorizing 
the taking of an arrestee’s DNA requires a judicial war-
rant or individualized suspicion, these searches must 
satisfy a recognized exception to the warrant or prob-
able cause requirement in order to survive constitu-
tional scrutiny. Because the so-called “special needs” 
exception permits suspicionless searches in a variety 
of contexts, it would seem to be the most appropriate 
category for analyzing the constitutionality of taking 
an arrestee’s DNA. 
Before deciding whether obtaining an arrestee’s DNA 
sample without probable cause or judicial authoriza-
tion constitutes a “special need” search, it is necessary 
to understand the scope and limitations of the Court’s 
special needs cases. Under the special needs cases, gov-
ernment officials are permitted to conduct searches 
and seizures without any individualized suspicion of 
criminality, negligence or malfeasance. Although indi-
vidualized suspicion and judicial warrants are gener-
ally required when the government intrudes into the 
privacy of citizens, the Court has recognized excep-
tions to this norm “when ‘special needs, beyond the 
normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant 
and probable cause requirement impracticable.’”111 The 
Court has applied the special needs formula to allow 
In sum, should the Court address the constitutionality 
of Louisiana or Virginia’s statutes authorizing the DNA 
sampling of arrestees, it will most likely find that the 
taking and analyzing of DNA samples is a search. 
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A. Origins of the Special Needs Analysis
Justice Blackmun’s concurring opinion in New Jersey 
v. T.L.O.119 marked the formal start of the special needs 
analysis. T.L.O. concerned the constitutionality of an 
assistant vice-principal’s search of a high school stu-
dent’s purse upon suspecting the student had violated 
a rule against smoking. The search revealed marijuana 
and evidence of marijuana dealing. The results of the 
search were turned over to the police and the state 
subsequently brought juvenile delinquency charges 
against the student. The T.L.O. majority ruled that the 
search was constitutional. Speaking generally, Justice 
White’s majority opinion explained that “the legality 
of a search of a student should depend simply on the 
reasonableness, under all the circumstances, of the 
search.”120 Under Justice White’s balancing formula, 
probable cause and judicial warrants are not required 
when school officials conduct searches of students be-
lieved to be violating the criminal law or school rules.
Although Justice Blackmun agreed with the result 
reached by the majority and “with much that is said in 
its opinion,”121 he cautioned that the majority’s reason-
ing had “omit[ted] a critical step in its analysis” when 
determining the legality of a school search. According 
to Justice Blackmun, Justice White’s majority opin-
ion was too quick to apply a balancing test. Blackmun 
believed that a balancing test was appropriate only 
after the Court had identified special or compelling 
law enforcement needs that justify dispensing with the 
normal requirements of probable cause and a judicial 
warrant.122 “Only in those exception circumstances in 
which special needs, beyond the normal need for law 
enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause 
requirement impracticable, is a court entitled to sub-
stitute its balancing of interests for that of the Fram-
ers.”123 Justice Blackmun believed that a balancing test 
was proper because “[t]he elementary and secondary 
school setting presents a special need for flexibility 
justifying a departure from the balance struck by the 
Framers.”124 According to Blackmun, maintaining dis-
cipline and safety in schools would not be possible if 
school officials had to show probable cause or await 
judicial authorization before searching a student.125
Justice Blackmun’s approach to resolving the Fourth 
Amendment question presented in T.L.O. was note-
worthy for several reasons. First, as Professor Stephen 
Schulhofer has explained, Justice Blackmun’s opin-
ion was an effort to “rein in” Justice White’s analysis, 
which had proceeded directly to a balancing test, while 
“bypass[ing] the presumption in favor of probable 
cause” that is normally required for searches that sub-
stantially intrude upon a person’s privacy.126 Second, 
when Justice Blackmun spoke of “special needs,” he 
did not restrict that category to interests unrelated to 
law enforcement concerns. Before he wrote the lines 
that would become the “standard of review” employed 
in subsequent rulings by the Court, Justice Blackmun 
explained that a balancing test was proper only when 
the Court was confronting “a special law enforcement 
need for greater flexibility.”127 And he used other law 
enforcement examples, such as 
frisking suspects for weapons and 
roving border patrol stops, to illus-
trate when a balancing test, rather 
than strictly applying the probable 
cause and warrant requirements, 
was appropriate for judging the 
legality of a search or seizure.  
Finally, Justice Blackmun’s spe-
cial needs formula was not an updated version of the 
administrative search doctrine. Almost twenty years 
prior to T.L.O., the Court had re-examined and re-
formulated its views on administrative searches. In 
Camara v. Municipal Court,128 the Court overruled 
Frank v. Maryland,129  which had effectively eliminated 
Fourth Amendment scrutiny for fire, health and hous-
ing inspections. In holding that health inspections did 
implicate significant Fourth Amendment interests, 
Camara explained that administrative searches would 
satisfy constitutional concerns if officials relied upon 
“reasonable legislative or administrative standards for 
conducting an area inspection” and obtained adminis-
trative warrants that authorized the searches.130
In his T.L.O. concurrence, Justice Blackmun did not 
utilize the framework established in Camara and its 
administrative search progeny. Indeed, Blackmun’s 
“plea for showing some ‘special needs’ is a far cry from 
the four elements that justified departure from the 
Fourth Amendment framework in Camara – a neutral 
plan, a compelling need to search, an absence of work-
able alternatives to the dilution of probable cause, and 
a substantially diminished intrusion on privacy.”131 Like 
Justice White’s majority opinion, Blackmun’s special 
needs model diminished Fourth Amendment safe-
guards. As Professor Schulhofer has observed, Justice 
Blackmun “was willing to embark on de novo balanc-
ing (and ultimately to uphold the search [in T.L.O.]) on 
the more slender basis of ‘special needs’ that render the 
probable cause requirement merely ‘impracticable.’”132 
To date, the Court has decided eight special needs 
cases. All but two of the cases involved suspicionless 
drug testing plans. And the Court has found that all 
but two of the searches were constitutional.
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Finally, as the proceedings in T.L.O. illustrated, Justice 
Blackmun did not propose limiting access to the results 
of a special needs search to those officials responsible 
for initiating the search. Perhaps because Blackmun 
did not contemplate that a special needs search would 
be restricted to contexts unrelated to law enforcement 
concerns, he raised no objection when the fruits of the 
search in T.L.O. were turned over to the police and 
subsequently used in a juvenile proceeding brought by 
state officials. 
B. Development of the Special Needs Doctrine
Although Justice Blackmun spoke only for himself in 
T.L.O., a majority of the Court soon adopted his special 
needs formula as the controlling standard for measur-
ing the constitutionality of suspicionless searches out-
side of traditional law enforcement contexts. To date, 
the Court has decided eight special needs cases. All but 
two of the cases involved suspicionless drug testing 
plans. And the Court has found that all but two of the 
searches were constitutional. When considered as a 
whole, however, the Court’s special needs cases do not 
provide an overarching theory that clearly identifies 
which searches will satisfy the Court’s constitutional 
scrutiny. 
1) Searches by governmental employers
O’Connor v. Ortega133 was the first case where a major-
ity of the Court adopted Justice Blackmun’s special 
needs formula to uphold a warrantless, suspicionless 
search. Ortega involved a governmental employer’s 
search of an employee’s private office for work-related 
reasons. Following the search, the employee sued the 
official in charge of the search and others, alleging that 
the search violated his Fourth Amendment rights.  
Writing for a plurality of the Court, Justice O’Connor 
ruled that a public employer need not have probable 
cause or judicial authorization before conducting a 
work-related search of an employee’s office. She ex-
plained that the “efficient and proper operation of 
the workplace” justified proceeding without tradi-
tional Fourth Amendment safeguards.134 Thus, Justice 
O’Connor concluded that “‘special needs, beyond the 
normal need for law enforcement make the…probable 
cause requirement impracticable’ for legitimate work-
related, noninvestigatory intrusions as well as investi-
gations of work-related misconduct.”135
Justice O’Connor’s finding that a special need existed 
in Ortega turned mostly on the motivations behind the 
search. She explained that when governmental supervi-
sors conduct searches for work-related employee mis-
conduct, “they have an interest substantially different 
from ‘the normal need for law enforcement.’”136 Public 
employers are concerned with the efficient operation 
of their agencies; they are not concerned with enforc-
ing the criminal law.137 She also stated that a probable 
cause requirement for searches directed at government 
employees would cause “tangible and often irreparable 
damage to [an] agency’s work, and ultimately to the 
public interest,”138 and that it was unrealistic to expect 
government supervisors to familiarize themselves with 
the niceties of probable cause, “at least when the search 
is not used to gather evidence of a criminal offense.”139 
After determining that a special need justified bypass-
ing the probable cause and warrant requirements, 
O’Connor announced that this category of searches of 
employees “should be judged by the standard of rea-
sonableness under all the circumstances.”140 
Interestingly, Justice Blackmun dissented in Ortega 
and argued, inter alia, that “there was no ‘special need’ 
to dispense with the warrant and probable cause re-
quirements of the Fourth Amendment.”141 Recalling his 
earlier opinions which were the progenitors of his spe-
cial needs formula, Blackmun characterized the special 
needs formula as approximating the exigent circum-
stances exception for traditional police searches. He 
explained that “only when the practical realities of a 
particular situation suggest that a government official 
cannot obtain a warrant based upon probable cause 
without sacrificing the ultimate goals to which a search 
would contribute, does the Court turn to a ‘balancing’ 
test to formulate a standard of reasonableness for this 
context.”142 
Keeping in mind this concern, Justice Blackmun ar-
gued that the facts in Ortega revealed no special need 
because there was no urgency to conduct a warrantless 
search of Dr. Ortega’s office.  
 [T]his was an investigatory search undertaken to 
obtain evidence of charges of mismanagement at a 
time when Dr. Ortega was on administrative leave 
and not permitted to enter the Hospital’s grounds. 
There was no special practical need that might have 
justified dispensing with the warrant and prob-
able-cause requirements. Without sacrificing their 
ultimate goal of maintaining an effective institu-
tion devoted to training and healing, to which the 
disciplining of Hospital employees contributed, 
petitioners could have taken any evidence of Dr. 
Ortega’s alleged improprieties to a magistrate in 
order to obtain a warrant.143
 
None of the opinions in Ortega elaborated on the scope 
or limitations of the special needs exception. Perhaps 
none of the Justices felt compelled to announce criteria 
for distinguishing between searches that are “beyond 
the normal need for law enforcement” and traditional 
police searches because the facts in Ortega undoubt-
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edly involved the former category. Moreover, unlike 
in T.L.O., the fruits of the search in Ortega were not 
given to the police or used to prosecute the target of 
the search. But a second type of special needs intrusion, 
searching the homes of probationers, would force the 
Court to address the applicability of the special needs 
exception to a search that was more characteristic of a 
traditional police intrusion. 
2) Searches of the homes of probationers
Griffin v. Wisconsin144 was decided in the same Term 
as Ortega. But unlike Ortega, Griffin involved a search 
that resembled a traditional police search for evidence 
of criminal conduct. A probation officer received a tip 
from a police detective that there might be guns in 
the home of Griffin, who was on probation. Two pro-
bation officers, accompanied by three police officers, 
conducted a warrantless search of Griffin’s home and 
discovered a handgun. After Griffin was convicted of 
the felony of possession of a firearm by a convicted 
felon, the Court ruled that the search of his home was 
constitutionally reasonable despite the absence of a 
warrant or probable cause for the search. The Court 
ruled the search was permissible because it was carried 
out pursuant to an administrative regulation that re-
quired “reasonable grounds” to believe that contraband 
was present in a probationer’s home. 
Speaking for the majority, Justice Scalia initially ob-
served that a “probationer’s home, like anyone else’s, 
is protected by the Fourth Amendment’s requirement 
that searches be ‘reasonable.”145 Yet, Scalia also noted 
that probationers “do not enjoy ‘the absolute liberty to 
which every citizen is entitled, but only…conditional 
liberty properly dependent on observance of special 
[probation] restrictions.’”146 Justice Scalia explained 
that a state’s operation of a probation system “pres-
ents a ‘special need’ beyond normal law enforcement 
that may justify departures from the usual warrant 
and probable-cause requirements.”147 The limitations 
placed on a probationer’s liberty helps to assure that 
probation serves “as a period of genuine rehabilitation 
and that the community is not harmed by the pro-
bationer’s being at large.”148 Achieving these goals re-
quires close supervision of probationers. Thus, super-
vision of probationers, including warrantless searches 
of their homes, is a special need “permitting a degree of 
impingement upon privacy that would not be constitu-
tional if applied to the public at large.”149 
In determining where to draw the line between crim-
inal law enforcement and special needs, the reasoning 
and result in Griffin are important for at least three 
reasons. First, unlike Justice O’Connor’s plurality opin-
ion in Ortega, Justice Scalia did not discuss or explore 
the motives for the specific search in Griffin. Justice 
Scalia’s special needs analysis appeared to assume that 
the purpose for the search was to ensure rehabilita-
tion and community safety. Second, unlike the search 
in Ortega, there was significant police involvement in 
the search of Griffin’s home. This fact, however, had 
no impact on the Court’s conclusion that the search 
was unrelated to traditional law enforcement interests. 
Finally, after finding that a special need justified the 
search, Griffin placed no limitation on who would have 
access to the fruits of the search. The handgun discov-
ered by the search was used to prosecute Griffin for an 
independent criminal offense, and not used merely to 
revoke his probation. Thus, the result and reasoning of 
Griffin suggested that the boundaries of a permissible 
special needs search would not be narrowly drawn by 
the Court.150
3) Drug testing
The third category of special need searches considered 
by the Court is urinalysis drug testing. Since 1989, the 
Court has decided six urinalysis drug testing cases, and 
has upheld four of the drug testing policies. Two of 
the cases involved federal policies; both of these plans 
were upheld by the Court. Two other policies target-
ing public school students were also validated by the 
Court. The remaining two policies involved drug test-
ing of candidates for state-wide political offices, and 
a public hospital’s plan, devised in close cooperation 
with law enforcement officials, to test pregnant women 
suspected of drug use. The Court found both of these 
policies unconstitutional. The results in these cases do 
not establish any general legal norm, other than the 
conclusion that the special needs exception “has pre-
cisely the effect of leaving the law-abiding citizen more 
vulnerable to invasions of privacy than the criminal 
suspect is.”151 The following discussion will concentrate 
on aspects of these cases that are likely to affect the 
Court’s thinking on whether taking an arrestee’s DNA 
sample constitutes a special need unrelated to law en-
forcement.  
a) Skinner and Von Raab
The Court’s first encounter with urinalysis drug test-
ing came in two companion cases, Skinner v. Railway 
Labor Executives’ Assoc.,152 and National Treasury 
Employees Union v. Von Raab,153 both written by Jus-
tice Kennedy. Skinner held that federal regulations 
requiring the administration of blood, breath and urine 
tests to railroad employees who violate safety rules, 
or were involved in railroad accidents, did not violate 
the Fourth Amendment. The challenged searches did 
not require judicial authorization, nor individualized 
suspicion that a worker had used narcotics or alcohol. 
Likewise, Von Raab upheld Custom Service regulations 
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mandating a urinalysis test from employees who seek 
transfer or promotion to positions directly involving 
drug interdiction or requiring the employee to carry a 
firearm. As in Skinner, the Custom Service’s drug test-
ing policy did not require any individualized suspicion 
that an employee had used drugs. 
Skinner explained that the government’s interest in 
regulating the conduct of railroad employees to ensure 
safety presents a special need beyond law enforcement 
that justified a departure from the traditional safe-
guards of judicial warrants and probable cause. The 
regulations targeted employees engaged in “safety-sen-
sitive tasks.”154 Justice Kennedy noted that the gov-
ernment’s interest to ensure the safety of the traveling 
public as well as the employees themselves justified 
restricting employees’ use of controlled substances. 
Requiring probable cause before conducting a search 
of a covered employee is inconsistent with the govern-
ment’s need to supervise employees. “Railroad supervi-
sors, like school officials, and hospital administrators, 
are not in the business of investigating violations of the 
criminal laws or enforcing administrative codes, and 
otherwise have little occasion to become familiar with 
the intricacies of this Court’s Fourth Amendment ju-
risprudence.”155 Finally, Justice Kennedy noted that the 
testing procedures mandated by the federal govern-
ment were not designed “to assist in the prosecution of 
employees but rather ‘to prevent accidents and casual-
ties in railroad operations that result from impairment 
by alcohol or drugs.’”156 
Unlike Ortega and Griffin, Skinner did address, al-
beit obliquely, the crucial question of who would have 
access to any evidence revealed by a special needs 
search. In a footnote, Justice Kennedy observed that 
although the challenged regulation “might be read 
broadly to authorize the release of biological samples 
to law enforcement authorities, the record does not 
disclose that it was intended to be, or actually has been, 
so used.”157 He dismissed the challengers’ concern that 
the testing process was a pretext to enable the gather-
ing of evidence for prosecutorial purposes. “Absent a 
persuasive showing that the [federal] testing program 
is pretextual, we assess the [federal] scheme in light of 
its obvious administrative purpose.”158 Finally, Kennedy 
left open whether “routine use in criminal prosecu-
tions of evidence obtained pursuant to the administra-
tive scheme would give rise to an inference of pretext, 
or otherwise impugn the administrative nature of the 
[federal] program.”159
Skinner’s discussion of the “access” issue seems al-
most purposefully vague. After directly stating that 
testing for controlled substances was “not to assist in 
the prosecution of employees but rather ‘to prevent ac-
cidents and casualties in railroad operations,’” Justice 
Kennedy seemed to retreat from this statement be-
cause the challenged regulations did provide for third-
party litigants to have access to test results.160 Thus, as 
Justice Marshall’s dissent pointed out, the “regulations 
not only do not forbid, but, in fact, appear to invite 
criminal prosecutors to obtain the blood and urine 
samples drawn by the [federal officials] and use them 
as basis of criminal investigations and trials.”161 More-
over, Justice Kennedy’s refusal to withhold approval of 
the policy unless law enforcement officials were denied 
access to test results “casts considerable doubt on the 
conceptual basis of [Skinner] – that the ‘special need’ 
of railway safety is one ‘beyond the normal need for law 
enforcement.’”162
Of course, one could argue that once the Court 
approved mandatory testing, the intrusion upon an 
employee’s privacy is the same regardless of whether 
test results are made available to third-party litigants. 
Therefore, as Professor Schulhofer has noted, “[i]t 
would be perverse to hold that innocent employees 
can be subjected to these indignities while drug abus-
ers caught by the test are shielded from prosecution.”163 
But the fact that an employee’s privacy interest is in-
vaded by testing ab initio does not address the sepa-
rate, and critical, question of whether a search that 
serves criminal and civil law purposes is consistent 
with the special needs formula.164 The most that can 
be said about Skinner is that the Court was unwilling 
to address whether “routine use in criminal prosecu-
tions” of test results would prevent application of the 
special needs exception. Although the Court could have 
sent a clear message on the scope of the special needs 
exception by approving the challenged regulations on 
the condition that test results be unavailable to law en-
forcement officials, apparently, a majority of the Court 
was not ready to take that step. 
Justice Kennedy’s special needs analysis in Skinner 
seemed to raise more questions than provide answers 
about where the Court was willing to draw the line be-
tween special needs and law enforcement. By contrast, 
his opinion in Von Raab was more straightforward 
on where the line between special needs and law en-
forcement was drawn. A mandatory urinalysis test for 
Custom Service employees who seek transfer or pro-
motion to certain sensitive positions was a special need 
unrelated to law enforcement interests for two reasons: 
First, “[t]est results may not be used in a criminal pros-
ecution of the employee without the employee’s con-
sent.”165 Second, the purpose of the policy was to deter 
illegal drug use among employees who might occupy 
sensitive positions in the Customs Service. 
When the fruits of a search are unavailable to law 
enforcement officials, the civil function of the search 
is evident.166 In contrast to the search in Griffin, the 
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searches in Von Raab would not be initiated by law 
enforcement officials,167 did not involve significant po-
lice participation, nor would the results be given to 
prosecutorial officials. When the procedures leading 
up to and the fruits of a search are separated from the 
tentacles of law enforcement, a stronger case for the 
special needs exception is demonstrated. 
At the same time, the second reason cited in Von 
Raab – the Custom Service’s interest in deterring drug 
use among its employees – also sends an important 
(and different) message about the scope of the special 
needs exception. Deterring drug use among a select 
group of governmental employees, particularly where 
there has been no demonstrated history of drug use 
among such employees,168 is a broad goal. Like the gov-
ernmental interest in “fighting crime,” the aim of deter-
ring drug use has an almost limitless reach and scope. 
If such a boundless governmental interest constitutes 
a special need that justifies intrusive searches without 
probable cause, then the special needs formula will 
validate many types of governmental intrusions so long 
as the government can identify rational, legitimate rea-
sons for the search. 
b) Urinalysis of public school students
The second set of urinalysis drug testing cases involved 
public school students. In Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. 
Acton169 and Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 
of Pottawatomie County v. Earls,170 the Court upheld 
policies that permitted mandatory and random uri-
nalysis drug tests of students who participate in ath-
letic and competitive extracurricular activities, respec-
tively. In each case, the Court quickly and easily found 
that school officials had a special need to conduct drug 
testing. Repeating the reasoning outlined in T.L.O., 
Acton explained that the warrant and probable cause 
requirements would undermine school officials’ ability 
to maintain discipline and order in the schools.171  More 
recently, Earls observed that Fourth Amendment pro-
tection differs in the school context because officials have 
“custodial and tutelary responsibility for children.”172 
More importantly, the Court also emphasized that 
test results were not released to any law enforcement 
officials. Although this point was not included in the 
part of the opinions explaining why special needs exist 
in the school context, as in other special needs cases, 
this factor helps to define whether a challenged search 
serves civil or criminal law purposes. For example, 
while considering the character of the intrusion caused 
by the urinalysis, Acton noted that “the results of tests 
are disclosed only to a limited class of school personnel 
who have a need to know; and they are not turned over 
to law enforcement authorities or used for any internal 
disciplinary function.”173 Similarly, Earls commented 
that test results are not given to law enforcement of-
ficials, and the results do not “lead to the imposition of 
discipline or have any academic consequences.”174
c) Chandler and Ferguson: Restricting the special 
needs exception?
The final two urinalysis cases do not fall into any of 
the categories described above. More importantly, in 
contrast to the cases already discussed, the Court in-
validated the challenged drug testing policies because 
the searches did not satisfy the special needs formula. 
In Chandler v. Miller,175 the Court struck down a Geor-
gia law that required candidates for certain state offices 
to certify that they had taken a urinalysis drug test and 
that the test result was negative. Speaking for eight 
members of the Court, Justice Ginsburg held that this 
law “does not fit within the closely guarded category of 
constitutionally permissible suspicionless searches.”176
In the second case, Ferguson v. City of Charleston,177 
the Court invalidated a public hospital’s policy that 
conducted urine tests of pregnant patients suspected 
of using drugs and turned the results over to law en-
forcement officials. Because the primary purpose of 
the hospital’s policy “was to use the threat of arrest and 
prosecution in order to force women into treatment, 
and given the extensive involvement of law enforce-
ment officials at every stage of the policy,”178 Ferguson 
concluded that “this case simply does not fit within 
the closely guarded category of ‘special needs.’”179 The 
reasoning in both Chandler and Ferguson is very likely 
to affect the Court’s thinking on whether taking and 
analyzing an arrestee’s DNA sample is a valid special 
needs search. 
In Chandler, Justice Ginsburg’s framing of the issue 
was noteworthy. The question before the Court was not 
simply whether Georgia’s law served an interest unre-
lated to law enforcement – which it surely did. Rather, 
the “core” issue before the Court was whether “the cer-
tification requirement warranted a special need.”180 
In determining that issue, Justice Ginsburg explained 
that “the proffered special need for drug testing must 
be substantial – important enough to override the in-
dividual’s acknowledged privacy interest, sufficiently 
vital to suppress the Fourth Amendment’s normal re-
quirement of individualized suspicion.”181
Georgia defended its law and the searches that 
it required as necessary to promote the integrity of 
public officials and to deter drug users from attain-
ing state-wide political offices. Without questioning 
the validity of these goals, Justice Ginsburg explained 
that the state had failed to identify a “concrete danger 
demanding departure from the Fourth Amendment’s 
main rule.”182 In other words, there was no evidence 
that high-ranking state officials were abusing illegal 
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Next, whatever one thinks about the doctrinal foun-
dation of Ferguson’s distinction between a search’s 
“ultimate goal” and its “immediate objective,”192 it is 
very clear why the searches in Ferguson were uncon-
stitutional. The purpose served by the searches “is ul-
timately indistinguishable from the general interest in 
crime control.”193 Putting aside the search in Griffin, 
none of the prior special needs searches involved the 
“collection of evidence for criminal law purposes” with 
an “extensive entanglement of law enforcement” per-
sonnel.194 When confronted with the argument that 
Griffin demonstrated that the special needs exception 
“was developed, and is ordinarily employed, precisely 
to enable searches by law enforcement officials who, of 
course, ordinarily have a law enforcement objective,” 
the Ferguson Court replied that the impact of Griffin’s 
logic was confined to cases involving search targets 
possessing a diminished expectation of privacy.195 
Finally, Ferguson sent a somewhat mixed-message on 
how the Court would react to a “multi-purpose” special 
needs search. On the one hand, Ferguson reveals that 
government officials will not be able to use the special 
needs exception as a loophole to implement suspicion-
less searches for law enforcement purposes. And it will 
not matter in future cases if state officials can articu-
late a broad, civil law objective that is simultaneously 
advanced by the search. “Because law enforcement in-
volvement always serves some broader social purpose 
or objective,” Ferguson explained, “virtually any non-
consensual suspicionless search could be immunized 
under the special needs doctrine by defining the search 
solely in terms of its ultimate, rather than immediate, 
purpose.”196 That approach will not work. 
On the other hand, because the result in Ferguson 
turned on the Court’s conclusion that the primary 
and immediate goal of the searches was to generate 
evidence for law enforcement purposes, the Court left 
open the possibility that a search that is primarily mo-
tivated for civil or administrative purposes, but also 
serves criminal law purposes, might slip through the 
special needs loophole. That possibility was made more 
probable by Ferguson’s distinguishing of New York v. 
Burger.197 Ironically, the search upheld in Burger was 
more characteristic of a police search than the searches 
invalidated in Ferguson.  
drugs. Proof of drug abuse among those targeted for 
searches “may help to clarify – and to substantiate – the 
precise hazards posed by such use.”183 Justice Ginsburg 
also observed that the statute was not “well designed 
to identify candidates who violate antidrug laws.”184 
Ultimately, Justice Ginsburg concluded that the state 
interest (or need) “is symbolic, not ‘special,’ as that term 
draws meaning from our case law.”185
In Ferguson, the design and operation of the drug 
testing policy was unlike any other policy addressed 
by the Court. Justice Stevens explained that the in-
trusion posed by the searches was considerably more 
substantial than in previous cases. In the earlier drug 
testing cases “there was no misunderstanding about 
the purpose of the test or the potential use of the test 
results, and there were protections against the dissemi-
nation of the results to third parties.”186 In contrast, the 
searches in Ferguson were intentionally designed to 
obtain incriminating evidence that would 
be turned over to police and prosecutorial 
officials.  
More importantly, the interest served by 
the searches in Ferguson was directly re-
lated to law enforcement. In previous cases, 
“the ‘special need’ that was advanced as a 
justification for the absence of a warrant or 
individualized suspicion was one divorced 
from the State’s interest in law enforcement.”187 In Fer-
guson, however, “the central and indispensable fea-
ture of the policy from its inception was the use of 
law enforcement to coerce the patients into substance 
abuse treatment.”188 Justice Stevens noted that “[w]hile 
the ultimate goal of the policy may well have been to 
get [patients] into substance abuse treatment and off 
of drugs, the immediate objective of the searches was 
to generate evidence for law enforcement purposes in 
order to reach that goal.”189
A few aspects of Chandler and Ferguson should be 
highlighted. First, Chandler appears to have “raised the 
bar” on the threshold requirement for a special needs 
search. It is clear from Justice Ginsburg’s opinion that 
a proper state interest unrelated to law enforcement 
is not enough to trigger the special needs formula. Al-
though reasonable minds might differ over the weight-
iness of Georgia’s interest in “set[ting] a good example” 
that its politicians did not use drugs,190 there is no dis-
pute that this interest is a legitimate goal, and one that 
is unrelated to law enforcement.191 In future cases, the 
state may have to show that its “special need” is par-
ticularly important and outweighs the privacy interests 
of individuals who are targeted for searches in order to 
trigger the balancing test that follows a finding that a 
special need exists.  
It is very clear why the searches in Ferguson  
were unconstitutional. The purpose served by  
the searches “is ultimately indistinguishable  
from the general interest in crime control.”
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labeled a special needs case, the result and reasoning of 
Burger provide a precedent for state officials who may 
claim that obtaining DNA samples of arrestees serves 
both “administrative,” as well criminal law, functions. 
Thus, the conflict between the holdings in Burger and 
Ferguson is likely to trouble the Court should it decide 
whether obtaining the DNA samples of arrestees is 
constitutional. 
Burger’s ruling that an administrative search can 
serve the same ultimate purpose of the criminal law, 
and that the fruits of that search can be used to pros-
ecute the target of the administrative search, takes 
on greater significance due to a footnote contained 
in Indianapolis v. Edmond.207 In Edmond, the Court 
considered the validity of highway roadblocks “whose 
primary purpose is the discovery and interdiction of 
illegal narcotics.”208 The Court held that roadblocks 
violate the Fourth Amendment when their primary 
purpose is to discover evidence of ordinary criminal 
conduct. Writing for the majority, Justice O’Connor ex-
plained that previously approved checkpoints were de-
signed to serve governmental purposes closely related 
to the problems of policing the international border or 
the necessity of ensuring roadway safety. By contrast, 
the primary purpose of the Indianapolis checkpoint, 
as conceded by the City, was to uncover evidence of 
ordinary criminal behavior.209
When confronted with the argument that her rea-
soning made the constitutional validity of the road-
block turn on police motivations, which are ordinar-
ily irrelevant to Fourth Amendment cases, Justice 
O’Connor did not deny the charge. She stated that “pro-
grammatic purposes may be relevant to the validity of 
[police] intrusions undertaken pursuant to a general 
scheme without individualized suspicion.”210  Justice 
O’Connor explained, however, that an unconstitutional 
roadblock could not be transformed into a permissible 
roadblock by the convenient claim that the checkpoint 
served the secondary purpose of keeping drunk driv-
ers off the roads or verifying licenses and registrations 
Burger involved a warrantless, suspicionless search 
of an automobile junkyard by police officers pursu-
ant to an administrative statute. “Although the statute 
helped assure that [vehicle] dismantlers are legitimate 
business persons and helped trace stolen vehicle parts, 
[searches] were carried out solely by police and their 
main focus was on catching the receiver of stolen prop-
erty.”198 The fruits of the search were used to prosecute 
Burger for felony and misdemeanor offenses.  
The Burger Court ruled that the search was consti-
tutional under its administrative search precedents. In 
reaching this result, the Burger Court also concluded 
that an otherwise proper administrative search is not 
illegal “because the ultimate purpose of the regula-
tory statute pursuant to which the search is done – the 
deterrence of criminal behavior – is the same as that 
of penal laws, with the result that the [search] may 
disclose violations not only of the regulatory statute but 
also of the penal statutes.”199 On this latter point, Burger 
concluded that the “discovery of evidence of crimes in 
the course of an otherwise proper 
administrative [search] does 
not render that search illegal or 
the administrative scheme sus-
pect.”200
Ferguson distinguished Burger 
on two grounds. First, Justice 
Stevens explained that Burger 
involved “an industry in which 
the expectation of privacy in 
commercial premises was ‘par-
ticularly attenuated’ given the 
extent to which the industry in 
question was closely regulated in-
dustry.”201 Second, and “[m]ore important” for special 
needs analysis, Burger relied on the “plain adminis-
trative purposes” of the statutory framework to reject 
the claim that the challenged search was a pretext to 
obtain evidence for law enforcement purposes.202 Thus, 
according to Justice Stevens, the fruits of the search 
in Burger were “merely incidental to the purposes of 
the administrative search.”203 By contrast, the searches 
in Ferguson were “specifically designed to gather evi-
dence of violations of penal laws.”204 
The tension between Ferguson and Burger is obvi-
ous: As Professors Stephen Saltzburg and Dan Capra 
have noted, “Burger seems to hold that criminal law 
objectives can be pursued through civil-based means 
under the ‘special needs’ doctrine,” whereas “Ferguson 
seems to hold that civil law objectives cannot be pur-
sued through criminal-based means under the ‘special 
needs’ doctrine.”205  Perhaps the tension is diminished 
because the Ferguson Court did not view Burger as a 
special needs case.206 But even if Burger is not formally 
The tension between Ferguson and Burger is obvious: 
As Professors Stephen Saltzburg and Dan Capra 
have noted, “Burger seems to hold that criminal 
law objectives can be pursued through civil-based 
means under the ‘special needs’ doctrine,” whereas 
“Ferguson seems to hold that civil law objectives 
cannot be pursued through criminal-based means 
under the ‘special needs’ doctrine.”
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of motorists. If that argument were valid, police could 
“establish checkpoints for virtually any purpose so long 
as they also included a license or sobriety check.”211 
Justice O’Connor then dropped an intriguing footnote 
where she explained that the Court was not address-
ing whether police may establish a roadblock with the 
“primary purpose of checking licenses or driver sobri-
ety and a secondary purpose of interdicting drugs.”212  
The hypothetical roadblock envisioned in Edmond’s 
footnote mirrors the search upheld in Burger. Both 
intrusions have the primary purpose of promoting 
administrative or “Fourth Amendment-legitimate” 
governmental interests, and a secondary purpose or 
incidental benefit of detecting criminal evidence. The 
fact that the multi-purpose roadblock may reveal or 
uncover criminal evidence does not undermine its 
constitutional validity. An “administrative [or “Fourth 
Amendment-legitimate”] scheme is [not] unconstitu-
tional simply because, in the course of enforcing it, [a 
police] officer may discover evidence of crimes, besides 
violations of the scheme itself.”213 Under the rule of 
Burger, “[t]he discovery of evidence of crimes in the 
course of an otherwise proper administrative [search 
or seizure] does not render that search illegal or the 
administrative scheme suspect.”214
In his analysis of Edmond, Professor Wayne LaFave 
has cautioned that “an illegal multi-purpose check-
point cannot be made legal by the simple device of as-
signing ‘the primary purpose’ to one objective instead 
of the other, especially since that change is unlikely to 
be reflected in any significant change in the magnitude 
of the intrusion suffered by the checkpoint detainee.”215 
But the reasoning and result in Burger and the Edmond 
footnote may encourage state officials to do just that, 
i.e., characterizing suspicionless searches as having an 
administrative primary purpose, with the discovery of 
criminal evidence as being “merely incidental to the 
purposes of the administrative search.”216 In any event, 
the Court’s special needs precedents provide little guid-
ance on how the Court will react to a suspicionless 
search that state officials claim serve multiple purposes, 
or has a permissible primary purpose, but a secondary 
purpose related to criminal law enforcement.217
IV. Is Taking DNA From Arrestees a Valid 
Special Needs Search?
Considered as a whole, the Court’s special needs cases 
do not neatly fit together as a coherent doctrine. As 
already noted, there are inconsistencies within the cat-
egory of special needs cases, and conflicts exist between 
the special needs cases and other Fourth Amendment 
precedents decided by the Court. Nevertheless, some 
fundamental criteria can be derived from the special 
needs cases to determine whether taking DNA samples 
from arrestees is constitutional. The criteria include: 
the purpose of the search; whether law enforcement 
officials will have access to the results of the search; the 
extent of police involvement in conducting the search; 
and finally, whether the search can be characterized as 
serving civil and criminal law interests. Keeping these 
criteria in mind, this section discusses the constitution-
ality of the Louisiana and Virginia laws that authorize 
the taking of DNA samples from certain arrestees.  
A. Purpose for the Search
From the inception of the special needs exception, the 
purpose for a search has been the most important fac-
tor in deciding whether the search serves a legitimate 
special need unrelated to law enforcement, or instead 
“is ultimately indistinguishable from the general in-
terest in crime control.”218 The Louisiana and Virginia 
statutes are plainly designed to serve law enforcements 
interests. In the case of Louisiana, the state legisla-
ture has made its purpose crystal clear: “The Louisiana 
Legislature finds and declares that DNA data banks 
are important tools in criminal investigations, in the 
exclusion of individuals who are the subject of criminal 
investigations or prosecutions, and in deterring and 
detecting recidivist acts.”219 The Louisiana legislature 
has also stated that “it is the policy of [Louisiana] to as-
sist federal, state, and local criminal justice and law en-
forcement agencies in the identification and detection 
of individuals in criminal investigations.”220  Therefore, 
to implement this declared policy, the Louisiana legis-
lature has decided that the “best interest” of the state 
is served by establishing “a DNA data base and a DNA 
data bank containing DNA samples submitted by in-
dividuals arrested, convicted, or presently incarcerated 
for felony sex offenses and other specified offenses.”221
If this statement of the purpose behind Louisiana’s 
law is not sufficient, other evidence that the state in-
tends to use DNA samples from arrestees for criminal 
law purposes can be gleaned from the statements of 
state legislators who sponsored the law. State Senator 
Dardenne, the sponsor of the 2003 bill that renewed 
police authority to obtain samples, explained that the 
benefit of expanding the state’s database to include 
arrestees was to identify perpetrators of criminal acts 
and to assist prosecutors in obtaining convictions of 
guilty persons.222
Similarly, Virginia’s statute equally serves the Com-
monwealth’s interest in assisting and solving crimi-
nal investigations. Virginia Attorney General Jerry W. 
Kilgore, the main proponent behind expanding the 
state’s database to include the DNA of arrestees, com-
pared DNA samples to fingerprints and said that ob-
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taining samples is a “public safety issue.”223 Further, 
General Kilgore remarked that “an enhanced database 
increases the chances of solving crimes,”224 and that in-
cluding arrestees’ samples into the database “will help 
[the state] solve cases much quicker and ensure public 
safety by making sure somebody’s not released back 
into the general public who has committed a string 
of crimes.”225 More importantly, a spokeswoman for 
Virginia Delegate Ryan McDougle, who sponsored the 
bill, confirmed that the legislators’ primary intent was 
to help law enforcement through the testing, analysis 
and comparison of arrestee’s DNA to that of evidence 
from unsolved crimes.226
Because the purpose behind the Louisiana and Vir-
ginia laws is to use DNA samples from arrestees to 
assist law enforcement officials “in criminal investiga-
tions”227 and to enhance the states’ “chances of solving 
crimes,”228 such searches would not fit within the spe-
cial needs exception. As far back as Ortega, the Court 
has approved suspicionless searches provided that the 
“search[es] [were] not used to gather evidence of a 
criminal offense.”229 Since then, the Court has been ad-
amant that the special needs exception is not to be used 
to implement searches for law enforcement purposes. 
Most recently, in Ferguson, the Court invalidated a 
drug testing plan because “the purpose actually served 
by the [hospital’s] searches ‘is ultimately indistinguish-
able from the general interest in crime control.’”230
To be sure, at this point in the development of the 
Court’s special needs doctrine, no one factor has been 
controlling or outcome determinative in the Court’s 
analysis. But the result in Ferguson strongly suggests 
that the “purpose” factor is a “first among equals” in the 
calculus. If this interpretation is correct, the searches 
authorized by the Louisiana and Virginia law are un-
likely to be upheld under the special needs analysis.231
B. Law Enforcement Access to DNA Searches
Another important factor for determining whether a 
suspicionless search will be upheld under the special 
needs rule is whether the results of the search are avail-
able to law enforcement officials. In the Court’s early 
special needs cases, this was not a relevant concern. 
In his T.L.O. concurrence, Justice Blackmun raised 
no objection to the fact that the results of the school 
search in that case were turned over to police officials 
and later used to bring juvenile delinquency hearings 
against the student. Likewise, no member of the Griffin 
Court objected when the results of the probation search 
were used to prosecute the probationer for an indepen-
dent offense. Finally, in Skinner, Justice Kennedy’s 
majority opinion was equivocal on this issue. On the 
one hand, Skinner noted that the plaintiffs had not 
seriously contended that the drug testing plan for rail-
road workers “was designed as ‘a pretext to enable law 
enforcement authorities to gather evidence of penal 
law violations.’”232 On the other hand, there was no 
denying the fact that the administrative regulations in 
Skinner authorized prosecutors to obtain the results 
of the searches. Notwithstanding this “invitation” to 
prosecutors,233 Skinner upheld the searches and of-
fered the mild caution that it was reserving “for another 
day” whether routine use, in criminal prosecutions, of 
search results would raise an inference that state offi-
cials were employing their special needs authority as a 
pretext to obtain evidence of criminal offenses.234
Since Skinner, the Court has been more adamant 
on the “access” issue, albeit most of the Court’s com-
ments have come in dicta. In approving the drug test-
ing plans in Von Raab, Acton, and Earls, the Court 
emphasized that test results would not be turned over 
to law enforcement officials. The statements in Von 
Raab, Acton, and Earls on the “access” issue were dicta, 
and were not especially important to the outcome in 
the latter two cases. In Ferguson, however, the “access” 
issue was directly addressed. The searches in Ferguson 
were substantively different from other special needs 
searches because the results were disclosed to law en-
forcement officials without the knowledge or consent 
of the patients.235 This fact was extremely important. 
“The fact that positive test results were turned over to 
the police does not merely provide a basis for distin-
guishing” prior cases,236 Justice Stevens emphasized 
that it “also provides an affirmative reason for enforc-
ing the strictures of the Fourth Amendment.”237
When one considers this legal backdrop and the fact 
that both Louisiana and Virginia make the test results 
of DNA samples “available directly to federal, state and 
local law-enforcement officers upon request made in 
furtherance of an official investigation of any criminal 
offense,”238 the Court will have to perform some creative 
legal analysis to conclude that taking DNA samples 
from arrestees constitutes a valid special needs search. 
Indeed, common sense suggests that the primary rea-
son for expanding state databases to include the DNA 
of arrestees is to help investigate and solve crimes. It 
would make no sense to obtain the DNA of arrestees 
if the analysis of samples were unavailable to police 
officials and prosecutors.239 “The legislative interest in 
DNA data bases has not been primarily to supplement 
or supplant fingerprints as markers of true identity; it 
has always been to generate investigative leads.”240 
C. Involvement of Police in  
Conducting a Search
Another factor the Court is likely to weigh in its spe-
cial needs calculus is the involvement of the police 
in conducting the search. In Griffin, an early special 
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search will not be declared unconstitutional simply 
because the search may disclose violations of both civil 
and criminal statutes.246 Although there is significant 
tension between Ferguson and Burger, for now at least, 
the Court has reconciled these cases by explaining that 
where the discovery of criminal evidence is “merely in-
cidental to the purposes of the administrative search,”247 
the administrative search will not be unconstitutional 
on its face. 
Because the searches authorized by the Louisiana 
and Virginia statutes undoubtedly advance criminal 
investigative purposes, there should be no reason for 
the Court to consider the constitutionality of a “multi-
purpose” special needs search. Ferguson is controlling 
and the searches authorized by the statutes should be 
declared unreasonable. That said, a majority the Court 
might be willing to broadly construe these statutes in a 
manner that permits the Court to assign other purposes 
to the laws. This type of “interpretative surgery” was 
performed in Burger. In Burger, the New York Court of 
Appeals concluded that a portion of the state’s vehicle 
code, which authorized warrantless, suspicionless ad-
ministrative searches of junkyard dealers, was facially 
unconstitutional.248 Although the searches were part 
of an administrative scheme directed at “closely regu-
lated” entities, the state court ruled that the statute was 
unconstitutional because it “authorize[d] searches un-
dertaken solely to uncover evidence of criminality and 
not to enforce a comprehensive regulatory scheme.”249 
In support of this conclusion, the Court of Appeals 
noted that the State had “concede[d] in [its] brief 
that ‘[t]he immediate purpose of inspecting a vehicle 
dismantler’s junkyard is to determine whether the dis-
mantler’s inventory includes stolen property.’”250
As discussed above, the Supreme Court reversed, 
and held that New York’s law was a valid administra-
tive search. In overturning the lower court’s ruling, the 
Burger Court explained that the New York Court of Ap-
peals had “failed to recognize that a State can address a 
major social problem both by way of an administrative 
scheme and through penal sanctions.”251 It also noted 
that an administrative search can serve the “immediate 
goals” of an administrative scheme, while also contrib-
uting to achieve “the same ultimate purposes that the 
penal laws were intended to achieve.”252 In sum, an 
administrative framework that authorizes warrantless 
searches “may have the same ultimate purpose as penal 
laws, even if its regulatory goals are narrower.”253
Although Burger was an administrative search case, a 
majority of the current Court may be persuaded to bor-
row the interpretative blueprint employed in Burger 
to uphold Louisiana and Virginia’s laws as permissible 
special needs searches. For example, the states might 
argue that obtaining and testing DNA samples of ar-
needs precedent, there was substantial police involve-
ment in the initiation and execution of the search, but 
that fact had no impact on the result.241  By contrast, in 
Ferguson, law enforcement and prosecutorial officials 
were involved in designing, implementing and achiev-
ing successful results in the search policy.242 As Justice 
Stevens’ majority opinion put it, when there is “exten-
sive entanglement of law enforcement” with a search 
policy, that policy “cannot be justified by reference to 
legitimate needs.”243
It is obvious that there has been significant law en-
forcement involvement in the design of Louisiana and 
Virginia’s statutes, and there will be substantial law en-
forcement participation in the implementation of the 
searches that these statutes authorize. In both states, 
law enforcement needs and the large number of un-
solved crimes were essential factors in the push to for-
mulate laws permitting DNA sampling and analysis of 
certain categories of arrestees. Louisiana’s law includes 
a provision where the state police “may recommend to 
the legislature that it enact legislation for the inclusion 
of additional offenses for which DNA samples shall be 
taken.”244 
More importantly, police officers will be intimately 
involved in executing the searches. Because an arrest, 
which is the consummate police act, triggers the state’s 
authority to obtain DNA, police involvement is inher-
ent in the acquisition of the DNA samples. Justice Ken-
nedy’s concerns about law enforcement involvement 
with the searches that were invalidated in Ferguson 
are just as relevant to the police involvement that will 
surround the taking of DNA from arrestees. “None of 
our special needs precedents has sanctioned the rou-
tine inclusion of law enforcement, both in the design 
of the policy and in using arrests, either threatened or 
real, to implement the system designed for the special 
needs objectives.”245 Thus, if Ferguson’s, rather than 
Griffin’s, analysis is controlling, the fact that police of-
ficials are intimately involved in the implementation of 
DNA searches strongly suggests that such searches do 
not satisfy the special needs exception.  
D. DNA Sampling as a “Multi-Purpose” 
Search
The searches in Ferguson did not satisfy the special 
needs formula because the Court determined that the 
primary and immediate purpose of the search was to 
obtain evidence for criminal law enforcement purposes. 
Ferguson, however, did not address whether the special 
needs exception would permit a search that is primarily 
motivated for civil or administrative purposes, but also 
has a secondary (or simultaneous) function or pur-
pose of discovering evidence of criminal conduct. As 
noted above, Burger ruled that a valid administrative 
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restees serves the civil or administrative function of 
providing a genuine or “true” identity of arrestees. In 
the convicted offender DNA cases, a few lower courts 
have ruled that the state’s interest in identifying the 
persons it arrests, prosecutes and convicts overrides 
the diminished privacy interests of individuals in state 
custody.254 The argument would continue that just 
as police officials are permitted to automatically take 
“mug shots” and fingerprints from arrestees for iden-
tification purposes, they should be free to take DNA 
samples from arrestees without any requirement of 
individualized suspicion.  
Some writers and scholars have recognized that the 
expansion of DNA testing to arrestees will serve the vital 
administrative purpose of discerning the true identities 
of individuals subject to arrest. Thus, Virginia or Loui-
siana might contend that taking DNA samples from ar-
restees is, as Professor Kaye has observed, “a kind of in-
ventory search, providing an unequivocal record of just 
who has been arrested, that is considered appropriate 
when the state takes an individual into custody.”255 But 
in another, subsequent article, Professor Kaye states 
that, in light of Edmond and Ferguson, it is “extremely 
implausible”256 that DNA sampling of arrestees could 
be justified under the theory that the primary purpose 
of the search is to ascertain an arrestee’s true identity. 
In that second article, Professor Kaye rightly notes that 
“[t]he legislative interest in DNA data bases has not 
been primarily to supplement or supplant fingerprints 
as markers of true identity; it has always been to gen-
erate investigative leads.”257 It is duplicitous to insist 
that the forcible collection of a blood or saliva sample 
from an arrestee is for “identification” purposes. As 
Judge Reinhardt has noted with respect to the manda-
tory collection of blood samples from federal offenders, 
“[t]he collection of a DNA sample…does not ‘identify’ 
a conditional releasee any more than a search of his 
home does – it merely collects more and more informa-
tion about that releasee that can be used to investigate 
unsolved past or future crimes.”258 
In sum, even if the Court is willing to perform “inter-
pretative surgery” on the Virginia or Louisiana statutes 
when determining the purpose of these laws, it will be 
difficult to conclude that the laws advance a primary 
purpose that is unrelated to ordinary law enforcement 
interests. Both of these laws promote interests that are 
“ultimately indistinguishable from the general interest 
in crime control.”259 While the searches authorized by 
these statutes certainly may advance the states’ second-
ary or ultimate interest in determining the identifica-
tion of persons held in custody or charged with a crime, 
the above discussion demonstrates that “the immedi-
ate objective of the searches [is] to generate evidence 
for law enforcement purposes in order to reach that 
goal.”260
Therefore, under the Court’s current precedents, 
forcibly obtaining and testing DNA samples of arrest-
ees, absent judicial authorization or probable cause for 
the search, cannot be justified under the special needs 
exception.
V. Conclusion
This article has discussed the constitutionality of 
Virginia and Louisiana’s laws, which authorize DNA 
sampling of certain categories of arrestees. Under the 
existing Fourth Amendment doctrine of the Supreme 
Court, there is little doubt that the intrusions permit-
ted by these statutes constitute searches. And under 
the Court’s special needs cases, a very strong argument 
can be made, based on the well-known purposes of 
these searches, that these procedures cannot be upheld 
as special needs searches unrelated to law enforcement 
interests. Thus, if the Court were to address the con-
stitutional validity of either or both of these statutes, 
an objective analysis of the statute themselves, when 
combined with an objective reading of the Court’s prec-
edents, indicates that the statutes should be declared 
unconstitutional.261
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